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Introduction 
 
 
  The reunification of Germany in 1990 has renewed old concerns over the potential for German 
hegemony in Europe.1  Opinion is sharply divided over the extent to which a unified Germany will 
pursue its interests in as conciliatory a manner as it had during the Cold War now that its most 
important goal since World War II has been achieved.  Many question whether Germany will stay 
focused toward the West or will instead turn its attention Eastward in its new condition.2  Others 
wonder if Germany will maintain its status as a "civilian power" or will endeavor to play a stronger 
military role in the new Europe.3  Some have even suggested that Germany will eventually acquire 
nuclear weapons despite having renounced them during the negotiations over reunification,4 while 
others argue that the demands of the unification process make it highly unlikely that Germany can play 
a strong leadership role in Europe, at least for the next few decades.5 
  Will Germany dominate the European Union?  If one were to judge Germany’s potential political 
influence by the mere possession of power resources and its past aggression, there might indeed be 
cause for alarm.  The rehabilitation of Germany over the last forty-five years is largely due to its active 
participation in Western institutions: primarily NATO and the European Community (now European 
Union).6  France and Germany have served together as the motor for the institutional development of 
Europe since its inception, and the Germans now more than ever easily dominate the EU in terms of 
economic power, population, and conventional military forces, accounting for about thirty percent of 
EU GDP.7  Germany’s currency  and  powerful central bank set the standard for anti-inflationary 
monetary policies in EU member states.  As a long-time practitioner of “checkbook diplomacy,”8 
Germany’s economic clout as an export market and as a financial contributor to the EU provide the 
Europeans with their two most potent sources of diplomatic influence: trade sanctions and foreign aid.  
These resources and Germany's historical legacy cause many Europeans their anxiety over whether the 
Germans will attempt to throw their weight around in the EU. 
  Yet Germany's leadership potential in the EU is not unlimited - far from it.  Germany’s formidable 
resources do not convert directly into political dominance; rather, they are strongly influenced by 
factors at both the domestic and EU levels.  Serious obstacles - opposition parties, legal barriers, public 
opinion, historical legacies, the interests of other EU members, and EU institutions themselves - must 
often be surmounted if the Germans hope to effectively assert their interests within the EU.  Overcoming these barriers, and exercising German leadership, depends on whether German actors are 
empowered during key moments in the formulation and execution of policy.  This empowerment in 
turn largely depends on the phase of the policy area in question and its related institutional mechanisms 
within the EU and Germany. 
  Recent German behavior as a partner in the renewed drive toward European integration 
since  the  1991 Treaty on European Union demonstrates the difficulties the Germans face in 
attempting to find a new political role for their country.  As always, Germany must walk a fine line 
between actively protecting national interests derived from its strategic position in the center of Europe 
and accommodating the concerns of other EU members.  At the same time, Germany’s leaders must 
work to overcome strong domestic opposition to a greater involvement in foreign affairs, particularly 
when a military contribution is required, while Germany’s Western allies are increasingly expecting 
the country to play a stronger role in situations which call for international collective action.  These 
often conflicting demands affect Germany’s ability to influence European policies.  To illustrate how 
political processes at the domestic and EU levels condition Germany's participation in, and leadership 
of, European policymaking, this essay will examine two specific cases of post-unification German 
political influence in the EU.  The two issues involved are perhaps the most contentious of those 
remaining on the EU’s ambitious agenda for complete economic and political union.  The analysis 
presented here suggests that Germany’s ability to help resolve them, and thus finally complete 
European integration, should not be taken for granted. 
  The first case concerns an economic issue and the development of the EU's internal sovereignty: 
the drive towards European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).  Germany is expected to play a 
decisive role here given the deutschemark's role as anchor currency of the European Monetary System 
(EMS), forerunner of EMU.  Indeed, this is what happened during the negotiation of the monetary 
policy provisions of the Treaty on European Union agreed to at Maastricht in December 1991.  
Germany was able to exert influence in achieving an agreement on EMU, yet after the Treaty moved to 
the individual states for ratification, a crisis developed in the EMS from September 1992 to August 
1993.  During this period Germany was unable to resolve the crisis through a realignment or a 
reduction in German interest rates.9 
  The second case focuses on a matter of external sovereignty and foreign policy cooperation: the 
EU's response to the break-up of Yugoslavia and the resulting wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
Again, Germany initially took the lead in the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in December 1991, 
an act which brought much criticism on Germany, but one which also precipitated the EU's own 
begrudging recognition of the former Yugoslav republics just one month later.  Yet after violence 
began to escalate in the region, Germany found it very difficult to intervene in a more substantial way 
to help resolve the conflict or provide aid despite much pressure from allies and the efforts of German 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl and his cabinet. 
  After a brief theoretical discussion, I shall demonstrate that in both of these cases German 
leadership was transformed depending on the phase of the policy in question, institutional constraints 
at the domestic and EU levels, and most importantly, on who was acting on the part of Germany.  
During these events Germany's executive was empowered in the early phases of policy: Kohl during 
the Maastricht negotiations; primarily German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher during the 
recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.  Yet during the crisis phases the country was prevented from 
acting more decisively thanks to Germany's constitutional provisions, decentralization of power, and 
the specific EU mechanisms (or lack of them) for cooperation in monetary and political-military affairs.  
During the EMS crisis, power over monetary policy shifted in Germany from Kohl to the Bundesbank, 
while EMS rules for cooperation in monetary affairs prevented Germany from engineering a 
realignment of parities.  During the Yugoslavia/ Bosnia conflict, Kohl was forced to engage his 
opponents in an unprecedented political and legal battle over allowing Germany to participate in 
sanctions-monitoring and peacekeeping operations abroad, while the EU provisions on European 
Political Cooperation (EPC) have so far been terribly inadequate as a mechanism to coordinate 
European military action, provide peacekeeping forces, or resolve war in the Balkans.  German 
behavior over the past several years thus highlights the extent to which any EU member - hegemonic 
or otherwise - must often reorient or even restructure its own domestic political interests and processes 
in order to comply with efforts to increase the EU's competence in key policy areas.  As long as EU-
level mechanisms for monetary and political cooperation remain weak, the extent of such EU-domestic 
harmonization may determine if European integration ever reaches full monetary and political union.  
 
European institutions and domestic politics 
 
 
  As EU member states are embedded in the most densely institutionalized network of relations ever 
devised in world politics, Germany’s ability to influence European policies depends on its command of 
a complex set of EU decisionmaking rules and procedures.10  This fact leads us to consider the role of 
major EU bodies such as the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Council, 
the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice in determining how a member state 
influences EU policies.  However, such influence also depends on the domestic political structures and 
processes operating within each member state,11 as national leaders and other actors continually 
redefine the relationship between their state and the EU.  This process of international-domestic 
interaction in the EU varies according to issue-area and the phase of policymaking in question.  Hence, 
the analytical framework presented here rests on several considerations concerning EU insitutions and 
domestic politics. 
  For example, the most ambitious changes in the scope of the EU, such as the Single European Act 
and the Maastricht Treaty, require revision of the Treaty of Rome.  This takes place through 
intergovernmental negotiations between member states, which empower chief executives (or their 
representatives) in the early stages of the process.  They enjoy a privileged position in the bargaining 
process and their preferences determine their countries’ interests vis-a-vis the EU.  Their dominance of 
the summitry process means they control the policy agenda and most sources of information about how 
the deal was made, which gives them an advantage over other domestic actors.12  Hence, a member 
state’s leadership of the EU at this point is a function of the bargaining position and negotiating ability 
of its representatives, who must strike a deal within the bounds of EU rules concerning revisions of the 
Treaty of Rome. 
  In addition, as recent work on “two-level games” reminds us,13 the need to ratify such agreements 
represents an important second stage in the international bargaining process, which allows additional 
actors to have a voice in EU policymaking.  In the EU, such  decisions  must be approved by a 
unanimous vote of the Council of Ministers, then by each member state.  At this point in the treaty 
revision process domestic politics can influence outcomes according to the ratification procedures in 
each member state.  States whose constitutions require them to ratify by referendum, such as Denmark 
and Ireland, often become more beholden to public opinion and general sentiments of national identity 
when asked to approve substantial advances in European integration, whether through widening or 
deepening.14  In other states, party politics and judicial bodies may play a greater role in approving 
treaties.  Both France and Germany, for example, typically empower their houses of parliament and 
their constitutional courts, not their citizens, in the ratification procedure.15  As I discuss below, this 
situation temporarily changed, of course, when French president Mitterrand called for a referendum on 
the Maastricht Treaty in an effort to boost his popularity.  This was a tragic mistake on his part, as it 
prompted the speculative attacks on weaker currencies in the ERM in the weeks after the Danes 
rejected Maastricht. 
  However, European integration does not proceed only through revisions of the Treaty of Rome.  It 
can also develop through day-to-day policymaking, which involves another distinct set of EU rules and 
domestic actors than does treaty negotiation.  This set itself varies by issue-area.   Some well-
developed policy areas in the EU, such as the Common Agricultural Policy or the Common Market, 
have strong institutional foundations at the EU level supported by a large body of ECJ case law.16  
Normal policymaking in these areas is likely to be dominated by lawyers, judges, lobbyists, and EU 
officials in Brussels.  At the domestic level, specialized ministries or interest groups might enjoy a 
privileged position (such as agricultural ministries and French farmers in the CAP), depending on the 
extent to which EU policymaking procedures draw them into the process. 
  In policy areas which have been less clearly delegated to the EU by member states, such as 
monetary policy and foreign policy, decisions are reached by institutionalized intergovernmental 
meetings between the appropriate national ministers.  The successful implementation of such decisions 
again rests on domestic structures and actors in each member state.  In monetary policy, for example, 
the key EU institution is the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System, which 
specifies the obligations of each member state in keeping exchange rates stable and inflation low through changes in government spending, interest rates or open market inter-ventions.  Any 
realignment of parities must be approved by a  unanimous  decision of national finance ministers 
operating within ECOFIN, the council of economics and finance ministers.  At the domestic level, the 
independence of each member state’s central bank largely determines whether its currency will be able 
to meet the requirements of EMS (and future EMU) membership, and thus aid or hinder the monetary 
integration process.  Those countries with the most independent central banks, such as Germany and 
the Netherlands, have clearly institutionalized anti-inflationary policies and are more immune to 
government attempts to place national economic goals over exchange rate stability (i.e., through 
inflationary macroeconomic policies) than countries whose central banks remain under government 
control. 
  In foreign policy, the main EU-level mechanism is European Political Cooperation, which was 
ostensibly replaced  by  the common foreign and security policy in November  1993.    Decisions made 
under this rubric are largely intergovernmental as well, thus dominated by chief executives or foreign 
ministers.  However, like day-to-day monetary policymaking, common foreign policy actions in the 
EU do not require ratification but do require unanimity.  Further, once a collective decision is made, 
the strength of any cooperative EU action is determined by the various contributions of individual 
member states.  Those states whose foreign policy practices permit financial or military contributions 
to a cooperative effort, such as Britain and France, play a stronger role than those states whose support 
for a common foreign policy is financial only (such as Germany) or largely symbolic (such as 
Ireland).17  To support the NATO/EU Bosnian policy, Germany’s institutional mechanisms required 
an overhaul, thus involving the constitutional court, all political parties and electoral concerns (public 
opinion). 
  Hence, the decisionmaking procedures of both the ERM and EPC, in combination with domestic 
institutions and policies, can stifle leadership by individual member  states  in political and monetary 
affairs, even for a country as powerful as Germany.  Although many excellent studies focus on 
institutional mechanisms at the EU level in analyzing Euro-policy,18 the cases discussed below 
especially highlight how domestic processes played a key role in Germany’s inability to exert its 
interests in a more forceful manner within the EU setting.  Germany’s decentralized federal system 
placed authority in the hands of its 16 Länder and the constitutional court during the ratification debate 
over Maastricht, placing demands on Kohl’s political energies.  This struggle took place as the 
monetary crisis broke out, while Germany’s highly independent Bundesbank, legally autonomous and 
dominated by Länder officials, assumed day-to-day control over  German  monetary policy.  During 
the Yugoslavia/Bosnia crisis, Germany’s tradition of coalitional politics made Kohl more sensitive to 
the demands of his junior partner, the FDP, when trying to forge a new military role for Germany with 
regards to sanctions and peacekeeping.   Also, the fact that the FDP held the foreign ministry, and the 
CDU the defense ministry, as usual in most post-war German governments, meant that Kohl’s cabinet 
was often split over the idea of using force since the FDP and the CDU did not always see eye-to-eye 
on this issue.  Finally, the German constitutional court and the SDP would also play a key role during 
Kohl’s battle to make Germany live up to its EU and NATO commitments where force was 
concerned.19 
  In short, analyses of EU policymaking which focus only on summitry or European-level 
institutions, whether from a “supranational” or “intergovernmental” perspective,20 provide an 
incomplete account of how integration develops and how leadership within the EU can take place.  
Member state influence at the EU level is a function of both the bargaining position of chief executives 
and the rules of policymaking in different issue-areas, but once control over policy shifts to the 
domestic level, other actors and institutions enjoy a more privileged position.  These claims are 
presented in the following table.  As the next two sections demonstrate, Germany, through its chief 
executive, was able to exert leadership during the Maastricht negotiations on EMU and the recognition 
of Croatia and Slovenia.  After these decisions, German influence at the EU level waned during the 
EMS crisis and the Bosnian conflict thanks to domestic political structures and decisionmaking rules at 
the EU level in monetary and political affairs. 
             Involvement of German actors 
   EU  level   Domestic  level 
Treaties 
 Negotiation        Chief executive     
 Ratification        Council of Ministers   court, parliament  
Policymaking 
 Monetary            C of M (finance minister)  central bank  
 Foreign policy    C of M (foreign minister)  parties, court, public 
        opinion 
 
 
 
The EMS/EMU case: From cooperation to crisis 
 
 
  There is little question that monetary politics is the one area of EU policy in which Germany 
reigns supreme.21  The EMS was created in 1979 thanks to the initiative of German Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt and French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, and the  deutsche-mark  soon became 
the anchor currency of the system.  Germany's solid anti-inflationary record and highly independent 
Bundesbank inevitably placed the country at the center of all discussions concerning monetary affairs.  
This role was evident during the preliminary phases of negotiations on EMU prior to the Maastricht 
summit.  During this period Kohl dominated the articulation of German priorities and his preferences 
repeatedly prevailed.  Afterward, however,  German  monetary policy became dominated by the 
Bundesbank's more immediate goals, objectives which effectively inhibited the resolution of the crisis 
that soon arose in the EMS. 
 
The treaty-making phase 
  Although he was initially lukewarm to the idea of a European central bank advocated by French 
finance minister Edouard Balladur, Kohl soon stated that monetary union would be on the agenda for 
the EC summit he would host at Hanover in June 1988.22  This summit produced a plan (the Delors 
Report) oulining a three-stage process for achieving EMU.  Stage 1 was scheduled to begin in July 
1990 with capital liberalization.  Stage 2 would establish a European Monetary Institute (EMI), 
predecessor of a European System of Central Banks (ESCB).  Stage 3, set to begin by 1999 and 
possibly as early as 1997, would irrevocably fix exchange rates and EU states would surrender 
monetary policy to the EMI/ESCB, with a single currency to follow soon after.23 
  It should be noted that Kohl's support for EMU was documented well before German unification 
was even on the horizon; to him it became a logical next step on the path to European union, a goal he 
had long championed.  Further, the major terms of unification were primarily decided between Kohl 
and Gorbachev; Britain and France had little opportunity to bargain with Germany over the matter or 
to offer unification as a concession for German agreement on other terms.24  Even so, Kohl's 
enthusiasm for the EMU project was also evident during the parallel talks on furthering European 
integration and unifying Germany.  He reiterated his commitment to a unified Germany operating 
within the broader integration of Europe, stressing that “We wish to be German Europeans and 
European Germans.”  His November 1989 ten-point plan for unifi-cation had endorsed French 
President Mitterrand's call for EMU, and a few months later the two leaders jointly proposed 
accelerating the EMU process to keep pace with German unification.25   In short, although Kohl may 
have used support for EMU to demonstrate Germany's commitment to European integration during the 
delicate talks on unification, EMU should not be seen as a simple quid pro quo to make a unified 
Germany more palatable to the West.  EMU was a major part of Kohl's broader strategy of helping to 
create a more peaceful and stable Europe; he was not forced into it by his European partners. 
  Fortunately for the advocates of EMU, Kohl's privileged position during negotiations meant that 
Germany's interests reflected his preferences, and they helped move the discussions forward.  If the 
Bundesbank had dominated Germany's interests at this point, agreement on EMU might not have been 
reached.  In contrast to Kohl, Germany's central bank was highly skeptical of, if not opposed to, 
European monetary integration.  During negotiations, Kohl often acted in blatant defiance of the 
Bundesbank and its president, Karl Otto Pöhl, who later resigned over this issue.  Pöhl did not not 
believe that a European central bank would be sufficiently committed to price stability; he also 
questioned whether it could be independent enough from European political pressures and whether 
national economies could converge enough to make a single monetary policy viable.26  He felt that in 
monetary union, Germany would be “sacrificing a hard currency on the European altar without knowing what we would be getting in return.”  His own preferences on EMU included four 
indispensable preconditions: 
  * participation of all EC currencies in the ERM (the currencies of Greece, Portugal, Spain and the 
United Kingdom were at the time not part of the ERM) 
  * complete capital liberalization in all twelve EC countries 
  * unalterable commitment of the future European Central Bank (ECB) to price stability 
  * complete independence of the ECB from political influence 
 
This list grew after German economic and monetary union in July 1990; Pöhl was firmly convinced 
that EMU could not take place until price levels and living standards had converged across the EC.27 
  But since EC rules regarding treaty-making empower chief executives, Pöhl's preferences could 
not prevail without the support of Kohl.  Up to and during the Maastricht negotiations both the German 
government and Bundesbank officials represented the country, and Bundesbank officials attempted to 
assert their points during the negotiations.28  But since the setting for these discussions was an 
intergovernmental conference (IGC) - required for any revision of the Treaty of Rome - only the 
German government had the ultimate authority to reach an agreement; thus Kohl could, and did, 
occasionally override Germany’s powerful central bank. 
  This is not to say that the Bundesbank was ignored during the Maastricht negotiations; indeed, 
most of the EMU provisions - a clear mandate for price stability, independence from national and EC 
political influence, and a federal structure - reflected the Bundesbank model and had been present in 
the Delors Report all along.  Capital controls would be lifted, and only countries whose currencies had 
been in the ERM and had remained in the narrow bands for two years could join the final stage of 
EMU.  These provisions clearly adhered to Pöhl's preferences and to the general consensus within the 
EU on the widespread outline of the project. 
  But Kohl explicitly abandoned the Bundesbank’s position on other points, which helped create 
space for compromise during the final phase of negotiations at Maastricht.  There were three key 
compromises between Germany and the rest of the EU at this point.  First, in talks prior to the IGC, 
Kohl did not press for strict economic prerequisites for moving to stage 2 and agreed to a fixed date for 
its commencement - against the explicit counsel of the Bundesbank.  Second, the Bundesbank had 
always insisted on adherence to rigorous, quantitative criteria for deciding which countries qualified to 
move on to the final stage of EMU.  Again, the German negotiators backed away from this position 
and agreed that not only the number but also the trends (on public deficits and debt) could be 
considered.  Third, and most significant, at the Maastricht summit itself, Germany consented to 
something that had previously been anathema to Pöhl and the Bundesbank: a deadline for beginning 
stage three of monetary union, at which time the European Central Bank would begin to function.  
According to German officials, this was purely a personal decision by Kohl himself, and one that 
surprised the German delegation because it reversed the position to which they had adhered until that 
moment.29 
  In short, it is difficult to see how these compromises on EMU would have taken place had Pöhl 
been in charge of the German position rather than Kohl.  Thanks to the EU's institutional rules 
governing the conduct of intergovernmental conferences and treaty-making, Kohl could override the 
Bundesbank and sustain the momentum for bargaining on the EMU provisions of the Treaty on 
European Union.  Kohl's behavior during the December 1991 Maastricht negotiations shows that he 
saw the EMU project as a necessary complement to German unification - even though that event had 
taken place a year before.  His preferences for tying a unified Germany to the integration of Europe 
were strongly asserted during this phase of monetary politics in Europe, and helped to sustain the 
negotiations on EMU. 
 
The policy-making phase 
  However, although Kohl was able to dominate German monetary  policymaking during the 
Maastricht negotiation phase, the Bundesbank quickly assumed the reins in the day-to-day 
management of this area by virtue of its institutional mandate.  As a result, Germany's monetary 
interests came to reflect the more narrow goals of its central bank (protecting the value of German 
money) rather than the broader goals of its government (further monetary integration into EMU and 
domestic economic growth).  This change in German monetary leadership from Kohl to the 
Bundesbank is demonstrated by the actions of Germany during the 1992-93 crisis in the European Monetary System.  The central issue was a divergence over credibility: the Bundesbank was concerned 
about the credibility of its commitment to the deutschemark while Kohl was concerned about the 
credibility of his commitment to Maastricht and further European integration.  As I discuss in this 
section, these divergent concerns lay at the root of Germany's difficulties in converting its monetary 
policymaking dominance into EMS leadership. 
  Although the Bundesbank officially endorsed the plan for EMU, soon after Maastricht it publicly 
stated that it had serious reservations along the lines discussed above.  In January 1992 it announced 
that it would issue a special declaration on EMU, arguing that more progress toward political union 
was a prerequisite for successful monetary union.  A rigid timetable for EMU as agreed to a month 
earlier was especially harmful in the Bundesbank's opinion.  Such sentiments would continue to issue 
from the bank in the months leading to the crucial Danish referendum.30 
  In addition to public declarations, the Bundesbank had other formidable resources at its disposal 
for controlling day-to-day German monetary policy.  Its legendary adherence to rigid anti-inflationary 
discipline derives from both its legal mandate and a firm public aversion to inflation.  The bank's 
independence is assured by legislation providing that it, not the government, is the final legal authority 
of German monetary policy, and the government is able to appoint only seven of the 16 members of 
the bank's governing board (the Bundesbank Council).  Also, Council members serve a fixed term of 
eight years and the Bundesbank enjoys full budgetary autonomy.   Finally, there are stringent limits on 
the Bundesbank's direct financing of the government, and it is strictly prohibited from financing 
government deficits.31  The Bundesbank also enjoys the support of the German citizenry in 
combatting inflation as a result of Germany's experience with hyper-inflation during the 1920s.  
Germans today are unwilling to risk even the chance that the deutschemark will so drastically drop in 
value as happened after World War I. 
  These foundations conducive to anti-inflationary policies are further bolstered by the decentralized, 
federal structure of Germany, which enables the Bundesbank to oppose most demands for fiscal and 
monetary expansion.  The Bundesbank Council is dominated by represen-tatives of the Land central 
banks, who seek to ensure the independence of the bank from govern-ment influence.  They are often 
dubbed the "Bundesbank's backwoodsmen" by critics for their anti-inflationary, domestic-oriented 
stance as compared to the bank's internationally-minded directors in Frankfurt.32  The Bundesbank 
thus enjoys a remarkable amount of autonomy in setting German interest rates, probably more than any 
other central bank in the world.  This discipline and the size of Germany's economy helped the 
deutschemark assume the de facto position of "anchor" of the EMS.  With the German currency 
playing this role, and with the Bundesbank pledged to defend it, the bank is highly sensitive to the 
credibility of its commitment to fighting inflation.  If the Bundesbank appears that it can be influenced 
by outsiders in setting German monetary policy, its hard-earned credibility will be lost.  When 
Germany is threatened by inflation, therefore, the bank will go out of its way to demonstrate that it can 
resist calls for a loosening of monetary policy, no matter what the circumstances.33 With this attitude 
on the part of the Bundesbank, the stage was set for a battle of wills between it and Kohl over the 
direction of German monetary policy after the negotiation of Maastricht.  This tension escalated into a 
dispute between Germany and the rest of the EU thanks to the deutschemark's role as anchor currency 
of the EMS. 
  The high costs of German unification, which far exceeded the expectations of German 
policymakers, created the pronounced inflationary pressures in Germany which precipitated the crisis.  
In fact, German inflation had been on the rise even before the Berlin Wall fell in November 1989.  
Inflation rose from 0.2 percent in 1987, to 1.3 percent in 1989, and to 2.8 percent in 1989.  During this 
period interest rates were raised six times by the Bundesbank, creating an even higher base level which 
the costs of unification would have to build upon.34  These costs skyrocketed after Kohl agreed to a 
one-to-one exchange of East German ostmarks for deutschemarks on wages, some household savings, 
and pensions.  This highly favorable rate was a successful effort to purchase the affections of East 
Germans in anticipation of elections in March and December of 1990,35 but it came at the expense of 
German price stability and aroused the consternation of the Bundesbank. 
  Following German unification and the negotiation of Maastricht, inflation began to creep ever 
higher, from 2.7 percent in 1990, to 3.5 percent in 1991, and then to 4.1 percent in the first three 
quarters of 1992.  The Bundesbank responded by raising interest rates four more times between 1990 
and 1992.36  By the time of the Danish referendum in June 1992, the discount rate - which established 
the interest rate floor for the entire Community - was 8.0 percent, and tensions appeared between Kohl and the Bundesbank and between Germany and the rest of Europe.   Immediately following the Danish 
referendum in June, the deutschemark began to rise in value, leading to fears that the Bundesbank 
would respond by raising rates once again to safeguard its credibility.37  However, where the bank 
would be empowered in the coming months by its institu-tional role in maintaining the credibility of 
German monetary policy, Kohl would be constrained by domestic political problems and would 
eventually be forced to defer to the central bank. 
  The Danish rejection of Maastricht stimulated national debates about the future of Euro-pean 
integration, and Kohl was forced to defend the treaty's goals in the face of an increasingly skeptical 
electorate, recessions throughout Europe, high German interest rates, and a Bundesbank on the watch 
against inflation.  German public opinion, never strong on the idea of a single Euro-pean currency, 
began to erode even further on the issue after June.  Immediately after the Danish referendum, 72 
percent of Germans were opposed to abolishing the deutschemark, and only 22 percent were in favor 
of a single currency.  Nearly 75 percent said they wanted a German referendum on the treaty after 
France announced on June 3 that it would hold a referendum on September 20, and 52 percent said 
they would still vote against Maastricht, even after the Irish approved the treaty on June 18.38 
  Opposition to the EMU project also came from German employers and trade union leaders, who 
united in a rare coalition to express their doubts about EMU at the Lisbon summit in June.  At the same 
time, Germany's industrial federation, the Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI), traditionally 
a strong supporter of EMU, abruptly turned against it, announcing Europe was not economically 
"mature" enough for monetary union; it should be "the last stone, and not the first, in the edifice of 
integration."  Following the September 1992 EMS crisis, only 40 percent of German enterprises were 
in favor of a single European currency, compared with 60 percent in 1989, and 80 percent felt that 
Maastricht needed improvement.  Calls for a referendum on the divisive issue went unheeded by the 
German government (and referendums are not provided for in the German constitution), which instead 
elected to use public declarations to reassure Germans and to foster support for the EMU project.39 
  In addition to the public fears about sacrificing the deutschemark for an untried Euro-currency, 
Kohl's hand against the Bundesbank was also weakened in the effort to ratify the Maastricht treaty in a 
wary German parliament, where both houses had to approve it.  The Bundesrat has been described as 
"one of the most powerful upper chambers in the world"40 since it is composed of representatives of 
Länder executives (usually ministers in the member state cabinets), and it used this influence along 
with the Bundestag to make ratification a long and difficult struggle for Kohl during the period of the 
EMS crises. 
  Potential ratification difficulties first surfaced when the German parliament announced in 
February 1992 that it planned to demand the right to "take stock" of EMU again in 1996 to ensure that 
the economic convergence criteria agreed to at Maastricht were equally enforced throughout the EC 
before proceeding to a single European currency.  Both the opposition Social Democrats (SPD), whose 
approval was necessary to secure ratification, and the Bundesbank challenged the ratification of 
Maastricht.  The SPD, which held power in 10 of the 16 Länder and thus controlled the Bundesrat, 
wanted a full parliamentary debate on the issue, and Otmar Issing, a top board member of the 
Bundesbank Council, expressed fears that the treaty might not be able to ensure monetary and price 
stability: "This aspect, and the question between monetary union and political union, should be dealt 
with more thoroughly at a later date."  He implied, like the SPD, that renegotiation of the treaty might 
needed.  Issing also warned that it seemed "almost impossible" for Italy, Greece, Ireland, and Belgium 
to comply with the rules on state debt and public sector deficits necessary to join EMU "in the 
forseeable future."41 
  A more serious challenge to ratification came when the prime ministers of Germany's 16 Länder 
demanded a veto on all future transfers of national powers to multinational institutions as their price 
for the ratification of Maastricht.  This action was a consequence of Germany's highly decentralized 
federal structure, a trait which would effectively inhibit Kohl's ability to respond to German 
reservations over Maastricht and the upcoming crisis in the EMS.  As one diplomatic critic put it, "This 
is what happens when the implications of federal logic are pushed to the extreme."42  Also, Kohl 
would have to contend with the SPD's demand for constitutional amendments to accompany 
Maastricht ratification, changes which included a precise definition of future European union, 
federalism, the rule of law, and the German concept of a "social state."   Finally, the SPD also wanted 
both houses of parliament to be given the right to "evaluate and approve" the final provisions of EMU.  
Given these concerns, Kohl and the parliament were at a virtual impasse over treaty ratification during the summer of 1992, and Kohl was finding it increasingly difficult to muster support for the treaty in 
and out of his government.43 
  A potential compromise was finally reached at the end of June 1992: a new clause in the German 
constitution would give the 16 Länder an effective veto (by two-thirds vote) of any future transfer of 
sovereignty to another institution, but this deal did not receive official accep-tance by the German 
government until October 1992.44  In the meantime, the German leadership was fully aware how 
much its reputation had been staked on the Maastricht treaty, particularly when the French gave their 
petit oui to the treaty on September 20.  Said one senior German government official two weeks before 
the crucial French vote: "If Mitterrand wins, then Kohl wins - and the opposite is also true.  The 
chancellor has invested a lot of credibility in Maastricht.  We were worried, but now less so.  We 
assume the outcome will be positive."45  The ratification battle in parliament did not end until 
December 1992, when both houses, having secured their  concessions, voted overwhelmingly for 
Maastricht.  However, during the period leading up to the final August 1993 crisis, the government still 
had to contend with the federal constitutional court to determine the legality of the treaty on which 
Kohl had staked his reputation.46  Given the different priorities between Kohl and the Bundesbank, 
low public support, and the actions of the SPD, it is no surprise that German leadership was hindered 
by domestic politics during the crisis. 
  However, German leadership, whether by the Bundesbank or Bonn, was constrained in another 
way as well: by the decisionmaking rules of the European Community.  As noted, with tensions 
mounting in the EMS during 1991-92 from inflation rate differentials in member countries, an ERM 
realignment - a combination of a deutschemark revaluation and a devaluation of the weaker currencies 
- at any point prior to September 1992 would probably have prevented the crisis.  The Bundesbank had 
tried to bring a realignment about as early as spring 1990 as a prelude to German monetary union,47 
and German monetary officials again floated suggestions of the need for a realignment in 1991,48 but 
these were not followed on.  The bank also suggested the need for an adjustment of parities at various 
times during the 1992-1993 crises49 and was rebuffed by other EMS members.  According to EMS 
rules, realignments require the consent of all EMS members and there was substantial disagreement 
over which member(s) should bear the costs of reducing EMS tensions.  For largely domestic political 
reasons, several of Germany's partner states - primarily Britain, France, and Italy - rejected the idea of 
a realignment.50  Thus, despite the pressures, the EC Monetary Committee officially ruled out a 
realignment of the EMS at the end of August, stating that it would not be "an appropriate response" to 
the tensions in European foreign exchange markets.  The governments of Britain, France and Germany 
welcomed the statement and pledged their commitment to intervene in markets if necessary.51 
  Following the announcement on June 3 of the French referendum, countries in and out of the EMS 
began to come under heavy speculative assault in anticipation of a French non and talk of a 
readjustment of parities became widespread in European financial centers.  Since the EMS members 
were staunchly opposed to any readjustment of parities or to abandonment of the currency grid as they 
felt either move would jeopardize the Maastricht project, the only alternative was defense of the 
existing parities via interest rates, and here the Bundesbank called all the shots.  EMS members hoped 
that Germany would not raise interest rates as the crisis heated up,52 but the Bundesbank was now in 
an even more powerful position since member countries had committed themselves to maintaining the 
EMS at all costs.  With the deutschemark as the anchor currency of the EMS, the Bundesbank alone 
could set interest rates on the basis of its own domestic (as opposed to exchange-rate) criteria. 
  Thus, since realignment was explicitly rejected by the individual EMS members and by the EC 
monetary committee, the Bundesbank could concentrate on price stability at home, confident that the 
other EMS countries would have to follow.  The Bundesbank's control of the German money supply 
would continue to direct the fortunes of the EMS.  At a key meeting in July 1992 the Bundesbank 
decided to maintain M3 growth targets, set in December 1991, of between 3.5 and 5.5 percent in 
determining its interest rates.  Since June 1992 M3 growth had been 8.7 percent (annualized), and 
since the Bundesbank correctly insisted that its sole mandate was to protect price stability for Germany, 
it became clear that the EMS was in for a rough year despite the fact that many member countries had 
moderate inflation, slow economies, and rising unemployment.53  Instead of coordinated realignments, 
changes would be chaotic and ad hoc during 1992-93, an outcome which all members probably would 
have preferred to avoid. 
  The German government kept up the pressure for the Bundesbank not to raise German interest 
rates any higher to reduce EMS tensions and help foster economic growth in the East, but the Bundesbank was not deterred.  Defying market speculation and government pressure, it attempted to 
rein in M3 growth by raising the discount rate to 8.75 percent on July 16, its highest level since 1931.  
Bundesbank president Helmut Schlesinger said his goal was to bring inflation down to 2 percent in the 
medium term.54  Kohl and finance minister Theo Waigel had personally advised against this rate 
hike,55 but the German government could only complain about the possible effect this would have for 
the economy and the EMS.  Two weeks later, Lothar Müeller of the Bundesbank Council defended the 
rate hike as a necessary response to the fact that Bonn had not acted strongly enough to bolster the 
German currency.56  This was a clear indication that the Bundesbank's priorities were not in sync with 
those of Germany's government, a situation to which neither the government nor the Bundesbank 
would usually care to admit.  Indeed, when the Bundesbank agreed to a small rate cut as the price for 
the September 13 lira devaluation, Kohl and Waigel tried to emphasize that the devaluation deal was 
not influenced by the government, although Waigel admitted that Kohl had made a secret visit to the 
bank to discuss the move.57 
  This pattern of Bonn pressure and Bundesbank intransigence would continue throughout the crisis 
of 1992-93, and virtually all relevant interests in Germany took turns at bashing the German central 
bank at various times to get it to trim interest rates.  German bankers, engineers, economists, labor 
leaders, retailers, and industrialists said the bank's tight monetary policies would delay the German 
economic recovery,58 while the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), among others, 
accused the Bundesbank of pursuing a "misguided and self-defeating monetary policy."59  Franz 
Steinkuhler, head of Germany's powerful IG Metall trade union, said the Bundesbank "sets itself apart 
from the democratic exchanges over economic policy aims with its extreme and one-sided focus on 
price stability. . . All too often a blow aimed at money supply ends up hitting companies' solvency and 
their abilities to invest."60 
  As the crisis wore on, government officials became much more forthright in their criticism of the 
Bundesbank, but to little avail.  In January 1993, Horst Kohler, the finance ministry state secretary, 
said the central bank should take into consideration slow economic growth and rising unemployment 
around the world at their council meetings.  Schlesinger again rejected this view, saying that 
"Monetary policy should not be turned into a pacemaker for efforts to kickstart economic activity."61  
Some critics called for reforming the way the bank gauges monetary growth as the Bundesbank 
continued to reject calls for interest rate cuts on the basis of this growth, although it did increase its 
monetary targets for 1993 to 4.5-5.6 percent in December 1992.62 
  These domestic pressures for Germany to ease monetary policy, however, were nothing compared 
to the heated recriminations between the Bundesbank and other countries.  German officials had 
suggested a realignment at the crucial Bath ECOFIN meeting on September 4-5, but this meeting 
proved a disaster; it served only as a forum for Britain and France to pressure Germany into cutting 
interest rates.  As Dutch prime minister Ruud Lubbers observed later, it would go down as a "black 
page in the book of 1992."  He said realignment "was not possible, because England had its pride and 
France said that it couldn't be done because it was facing a difficult referendum and they couldn't 
discuss it; and the English said then that the Bundesbank should do something first, and so the 
discussion went."63  Danish economy minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen said that "Eleven countries 
have put colossal pressure on the Germans to lower rates, far more than I've ever experienced."  British 
Chancellor Norman Lamont claimed that the bank had pledged not to raise rates further, but 
Schlesinger denied that he had made any such promise, arguing that he had no room to cut rates due to 
continuing inflationary pressures in Germany.64 
  The Bundesbank attempted another realignment with Britain and France one week later, but 
French treasury director Jean-Claude Trichet neglected to call a meeting to consider the issue while 
Britain and France again urged Germany to cut interest rates unilaterally to ease EMS pressures.65  
The weekend before Black Wednesday (September 16), the Bundesbank again tried to include other 
countries in its deal with Italy to cut interest rates in exchange for a devaluation, but other EMS 
members were adamantly opposed.  After Black Wednesday, other EMS countries (and German 
commentators) were content to criticize the Bundesbank for harming Europe's economy and to attack 
Schlesinger for publicly suggesting the possibility of a realignment.  Those remarks, critics asserted, 
are said to have triggered the massive speculative attacks against the British pound which forced its 
exit from the EMS.  Schlesinger denied the comments, but the markets had already reacted.66  In short, 
despite the Bundesbank's presumed dominance of European monetary politics, the institutional rules of the EMS prevented anything more than suggestions or hints on the part of Germany for a much-needed 
realignment of parities. 
  Lacking the institutional authority at the EU level to engineer a coordinated adjustment of parities 
in return for an easing of monetary policy, the Bundesbank relied on its own domestic mandate to set 
German interest rates.  This is not to say that the bank completely ignored the worsening economic 
circumstances in Europe during the crisis period.  With its relaxed M3 targets for 1993 the bank was 
able to make a series of interest rate cuts during the first half of the year.67  But when pressured to do 
so, the Bundesbank reacted harshly even when Germany's economic "fundamentals" (lower rates of 
growth for inflation, wages, and money supply) made it seem a cut might be justified.  For example, 
France (among others) tried again several times in 1993 to pressure the Bundesbank to cut rates for the 
benefit of Europe, but the bank would only cut rates when such pressure was absent in an effort to 
demonstrate its independence.  The French seemed to have difficulty learning this lesson, as revealed 
by French finance minister Edmond Alphandery's invitation to German officials to Paris for “talks on 
rate cuts” in June 1993.  The bank's response was decidedly negative, and the effort may have 
contributed to the bank's failure to cut discount rates the following month, which precipitated the final 
EMS crisis.68 
  As following the Bundesbank became burdensome for the other ERM members, some began to 
suggest that the French franc act alongside the deutschemark to create a "dual anchor" system, or even 
to replace the deutschemark as the sole anchor of the EMS.  The French economy enjoyed lower rates 
of inflation than Germany during 1991-92, a balance of payments surplus, and a budget deficit less 
than half of Germany's.69  France also took steps in 1993 to bring about the independence of the Bank 
of France, which was required by the Maastricht treaty but also necessary if the franc were to enjoy 
sufficient credibility to serve as an ERM anchor.  In other words, France was altering domestic 
institutions in part to position itself to lead the ERM, affirming the argument that domestic structures 
are an important factor in enabling a country to influence the EU.70  The French franc also gained 
strength for a time after the March 1993 French parliamentary elections, prompting a series of interest 
rate cuts and further speculation that the franc could serve as anchor of the EMS.71 
  With the franc rising, the deutschemark's fortunes declined somewhat after a second Danish 
referendum approved Maastricht on May 18, 1993.  This event spurred trading in currencies outside 
the deutschemark bloc, while Germany continued to suffer from high unemployment and interest rates 
coupled with budgetary difficulties.  The deutschemark might have been overvalued by as much as 20 
percent during mid-1993 after the series of devaluations during 1992-93, and the French franc was 
appearing more to be a joint anchor of the EMS.72  Other EMS members - the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Belgium - also began decoupling their monetary policies from Germany's and lowering their interest 
rates unilaterally in mid-1993.  After short-term French rates fell below Germany's for the first time in 
26 years on June 22, 1993, in another series of coordinated rate cuts with the Netherlands and Belgium, 
more calls were heard (from the Bank of France, Delors, and others) for France to attempt to assume 
greater co-anchorship of the EMS in an effort to erode German dominance.73 
  Both Waigel and Bundesbank vice-president Hans Tietmeyer defended the deutschemark's role as 
anchor in late June 1993,74 but this ultimately proved unnecessary as events would soon show how 
resilient the German currency actually was, especially when compared to the quickly- weakening 
French franc.75  After much pressure from the Bundesbank, Germany's ruling coalition finally agreed 
to a package of budget cuts worth DM25bn by the end of June (this was reduced to DM21bn in mid-
July), prompting a short series of final rate cuts before the last crisis and a resur-gence of the 
deutschemark at the expense of the franc.76  However, during this entire series of crises the 
Bundesbank had become increasingly aware of the inflationary effects of mandatory interventions in 
support of other currencies, and the bank apparently reached its limit by August 1993.  The 
Bundesbank had discussed this problem privately after the September 1992 lira devaluation, and 
Schlesinger had alluded to this problem in public comments over the previous months.  In June 1993 
he criticized EMS reform attempts when the proposals suggested that Germany should agree to 
increased intramarginal mandatory intervention to defend exchange rates.77 
  In view of the Bundesbank's awareness of this problem, the actions it took towards the end of the 
crisis in July 1993 reveal the quandary it faced during this period.  To protect its credibility, the bank 
resisted pressures to cut interest rates further, which prompted the usual speculative attacks on the 
French franc and other weak EMS currencies.  But, since rate hikes in weak currency countries were 
ruled out due to economic stagnation, the bank was forced by ERM rules into massive interventions on foreign exchange markets to support those weak currencies, spending as much as 20-25 billion 
deutschemarks in late July 1993 alone.  These currency sales only contributed more to inflationary 
pressures in Germany, prompting further German monetary tightening, which started the process all 
over again.  As Schlesinger had noted in the September 1992 crisis, the Bundesbank was caught in a 
"foreign exchange trap" from which there were few exit options.78  Only after the ERM bands were 
widened in August 1993 at the end of the crisis could the bank announce with relief that "Owing to the 
greater flexibility in the operation of (EMS) rules, potential tensions have been lessened at the same 
time, and thus a major contribution has been made to containing intervention volumes."79  In the final 
negotiations of the crisis, with France and Germany in intense confrontation, the Bundesbank 
adamantly opposed both a unilateral rate cut and the withdrawal of the deutschemark from the EMS.80 
  In sum, Kohl's personal dominance of German monetary goals during treaty negotiations ended 
once the treaty had been signed and domestic institutional structures shifted power elsewhere: to the 
Bundesbank and the parliament.  The bank controlled monetary policy and maintained high interest 
rates in the face of demands, from within Germany and especially from other EC states, to relax them.  
The parliament controlled the ratification procedure and kept the pressure on Kohl.  To be sure, Kohl 
and the Bundesbank were defending two potent symbols of German interests: the Maastricht treaty, 
which Kohl had negotiated to tie Germany to Europe, and the deutschemark, which the Bundesbank 
was legally committed to defend.  However, because of the bank's firmly institutionalized 
independence, it was immune to external pressures, and refused to relieve the ERM crisis by means of 
lower interest rates. 
  The demands of the ratification process further constrained the government; it could hardly 
pressure the Bundesbank because its political energies were being absorbed by Maastricht ratification 
in a setting of widespread public skepticism.  Finally, the decisionmaking rules of the EC prevented the 
Bundesbank or Bonn from acting to prevent what all EMS members probably would have preferred to 
avoid: a year-long series of ad hoc realignments.  A preemptive realignment could have eased the 
pressures in Europe's foreign exchange markets, but such a move requires unanimity among ERM 
members.  Since the EMS was serving as a surrogate for future EMU, and since members needed to 
foster public support for further monetary integration, the EMS was hardened into a fixed exchange 
rate regime at the very moment when it most required flexibility.  Thus for several states, and for many 
reasons, a change in parities was out of the question.  As this section has shown, German domestic 
politics and the constraints of ERM rules were at the heart of Germany's difficulty in translating its 
EMS dominance into leadership during a period of dire need. 
 
 
The Yugoslavia/Bosnia case: From German pressure to paralysis 
 
 
  Economic and monetary union was not the only policy area influenced by German leadership 
during the negotiations at the Maastricht summit in December 1991.  The Germans pursued another 
course of action which, critics argue, fostered one of the most tragic events of our times: the wars in 
the former Yugoslavia.  Germany's unilateral recognition of Croatia and Slovenia on December 23 - 
three weeks before its EU partners took the same step, and before mechanisms were in place to protect 
ethnic minorities in these states - was said to have precipitated the terrible violence in these regions 
that continues to this day.81  As I discuss in this section, Germany was able to assert itself during the 
recognition phase, but afterward domestic debates, historical images, and EU rules have prevented the 
Germans from playing a stronger role in confronting the problems generated by Yugoslavia's 
disintegration. 
 
The recognition phase 
  While Kohl had been merely influential during the EMU negotiations, in the case of Slovenia and 
Croatia the Germans were far and away the chief instigators of EC policy during the recognition phase.  
Their influence was not evident at the beginning, for in the early stages of the crisis Germany more or 
less agreed with its EC partners that Yugoslavia should be kept whole.  During the entire first year of 
the crisis - beginning in April 1990 when newly-elected Croatian president Franjo Tudjman refused to 
grant minority rights to the 600,000 Serbs residing in his republic - both Germany and the EC 
essentially had adopted a "wait and see" attitude.  With world attention focused on Iraq's invasion of Kuwait a few months later, it was not until early 1991 when Europe began to seriously consider what 
to do about Yugoslavia.  Toward the end of keeping the country together, the EC suggested a possible 
association with Yugoslavia in April; in June a five-year, 807 million-ECU loan was offered as a 
further incentive.  As noted, Kohl supported Europe's policy at first; his CDU/CSU coalition had even 
suggested a month earlier that the EC act as a mediator in the conflict.82 
  These early efforts, of course, did not prevent war from breaking out between Croatia and Serbia 
after Croatia and Slovenia declared independence on June 25, 1991.  As an effort to stem the violence 
and gain some breathing room for negotiations, the Brioni Accord was agreed to on June 28: Croatia 
and Slovenia would suspend independence for three months in exchange for a withdrawal of 
Yugoslavian (i.e., Serbian) troops.  But divisions had appeared in the EC since the claims of 
independence: while the EC was considering some form of confederation to keep Yugo-slavia whole, 
the CDU and the SPD both called for self-determination of the former Yugoslav republics.  On July 1 
Kohl threatened to cut off German aid to Yugoslavia if it sent the Yugo-slavian National Army (JNA) 
back into Croatia, and he began to suggest that self-determination for the two breakaway republics 
might be in order.  Kohl also had a confederation in mind at this point, but he added that "If that 
doesn't work, then we'll have to think again."  His future defense minister, Volker Rühe, explicitly 
urged that Germany and the EC formally recognize indepen-dence.  By July 9 the FDP had joined as 
well; a general consensus in support of recognition became evident throughout Germany's political 
elite, and the country was now in a position to exert stronger demands for the EC's recognition of 
Slovenia and Croatia.83  These efforts took place incrementally, as Kohl and German foreign minister 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher sought to build their case over the next few months that the democratic rights 
of Slovenians and Croatians were being violated, that the Serbs were the chief antagonists in the 
conflict, and that by withholding recognition the EC was merely delaying the inevitable and 
prolonging the war. 
  Germany’s diplomatic moves along these lines began when Genscher argued in a EC foreign 
ministers meeting on July 5 that recognition should be the EC's policy, a suggestion which was refused 
by others.  A month later Genscher tried to arrange permission for Slovenian and Croatian 
representatives to attend a meeting with the EC over the issue at the Hague.  He also argued for the 
imposition of sanctions on Serbia, but was again refused on both points.  Two major conferences held 
at the Hague in September further exposed disagreements over the use of force in the region in the 
absence of a definite cease-fire among the warring parties.  Although EC aid to the former Yugoslavia 
was frozen, Germany also began to publicly consider the imposition of unilateral sanctions against 
Yugoslavia in defiance of the EC - a serious threat considering that Germany was its main trading 
partner.84 
  Germany's position received a boost after the EC recognized the independent Soviet republics.  
But the EC still argued that recognition would only add fuel to the fire in Croatia.  Although the 
Germans strongly disagreed thanks to the rash of broken cease fires (13 by the end of September), and 
argued for the recognition of Croatia even without protection of Serbs there, they still acted within the 
confines of EC mechanisms and discussions regarding political cooper-ation throughout the fall of 
1991.  It was felt that German economic clout, the chief diplomatic weapon at this point, would be 
more influential toward pressuring the Serbs in the EC rather than in a broader international framework.  
After Serbia and Montenegro expulsed the other four republics from the Yugoslavian government on 
October 1, Germany's view of the situation prevailed a few days later when the EC foreign ministers 
agreed at last to allow two final months of negotiations.  Recognition would be granted on December 
10 if peace efforts failed.  The EC also imposed sanctions on all of Yugoslavia in November while the 
Bundestag officially declared that the Serbians were the aggressors in the conflict.  This act 
precipitated the EC's own admission that the Serbs were to blame for the war.85 
 
  By December the EC had lifted sanctions except for the rump Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro.  
Kohl, still under the impression that EC recognition would proceed this month, told Tudjman that he 
wanted to recognize Croatia along with as many EC states as possible before Christmas.  Sweden, Italy, 
Austria, and Hungary were also likely to follow the German decision.  But France, Britain and the U.S. 
still argued for recognition only as part of a larger peace settlement.  However, Kohl decided that 
German recognition would take place even without the support of the EC.  Most world attention at this 
point was focused on the broader Maastricht negotiations, and Genscher claims he did not push the matter here, but he did argue against the UN and managed to line up Italy, Belgium, Denmark, and 
possibly the Netherlands (and some non-EC states as well) in support of recognition by this time.86 
  In mid-December Germany agreed to a compromise: EC recognition would take place on January 
15, 1992, provided certain human rights conditions were fulfilled.  Unfortunately this meeting did not 
specify what would happen if conditions were not met.  Both Croatia and Germany claimed the 
Croatians met the conditions for recognition, but this was questionable.  Since the chief obstacles in the 
EC against recognition were Britain and France, Kohl offered Major his support on the Maastricht 
treaty if Britain would support Germany's policy on Croatia.  Once Britain was on board, France fell in 
line.87 
  In any event, the EC resolution agreed to on December 16 specified that December 23 was the 
first day on which a member country could declare that Croatia or Slovenia had met the conditions for 
recognition, while formal EC recognition would take place on January 15 after any last-ditch efforts at 
mediation.  The Germans took this route, and with their belief that Croatia would fulfill human rights 
requirements they felt justified in pulling ahead of the EC and recognizing Croatia and Slovenia on 
December 23, 1991, a move widely expected given the compromise a week earlier.  Germany would 
open official diplomatic relations on January 15 with the rest of the EC.  On January 10, the Germans 
pledged to continue this course of action and open embassies in the new republics even if Slovenia and 
Croatia did not fully meet the conditions set for recognition by the EC.  The EC apparently adopted the 
German attitude regarding Croatia's potential commitment to meeting human rights conditions when it 
recognized the independent states on January 15.  This position shift was certainly aided when the JNA 
shot down and killed five members of an EC monitoring mission on January 8, 1992.88   As it 
happened, these conditions were basically ignored as the EC's response to the Yugoslavian situation 
moved to a new phase: attempts at intervention and peacekeeping.  Here the Germans plainly found 
themselves in a subordinate role in the drama, especially after the Bosnian Muslims and Croats 
formally declared independence in March 1992 and war broke out there soon after. 
 
The intervention phase 
  After recognition changed the Balkan conflict from a civil war into an international one, the 
concerned parties were forced to turn more toward sanctions and peacekeeping to halt the destruction.  
At this stage Germany largely - and quite unwillingly - found itself in a minor role in international 
efforts to impose sanctions and provide peacekeeping forces.  Yet, unlike the EMS case, Kohl did not 
have to compete with a strong domestic institution like the Bundesbank for control of German policy 
during either the recognition phase or the intervention phase.  Instead, his government was constrained 
first, by formal German constitutional provisions regarding the use of military force abroad, and 
second, by the informal institutional prohibition - memories of the Nazi occupation of the Balkans - 
against using German forces in the former Yugoslavia.  The first constraint was partially overcome 
after a protracted political struggle within Germany, but the second one still exerts considerable 
influence, as one might expect. 
  The awareness of German officials that their country might have profound difficulties in meeting 
international commitments calling for military forces was evident months before the Bosnian war 
broke out.  After the Germans had been criticized for their limited role in the Persian Gulf War, Kohl 
promised in February 1991 to push the SPD into accepting a constitutional change permitting such 
participation in international missions.  Kohl's then-defense minister, Gerhard Stoltenberg, even 
suggested the idea of a German rapid deployment force for responding to future crises.89  But the 
Social Democrats' wariness of German military involvement abroad indicated that Kohl would have a 
tough battle trying to muster the two-thirds majority in the German parliament necessary for such a 
change.  The FDP as well was concerned about the legality of such German military operations.  As 
events soon would prove after the Bosnian war began to escalate a year later, the German government 
had to overcome considerable domestic opposition, primarily among political elites, in order to 
implement these revolutionary reforms.  Germany’s main political parties had been united over the 
recognition of the former Yugoslav republics, but during this phase they were split over the idea of a 
new military role for Germany. 
  In particular, differences over interpreting article 24 (permitting participation in collective 
security), article 26 (denouncing aggressive war as unconstitutional), and article 87a (stating German 
armed forces are for defensive purposes only) of Germany's Basic Law had to be addressed.  Strict 
interpretation of article 87a meant that it had typically taken priority over article 24 in German defense policy, creating an informal institutional prohibition among Germany's citizens and parties against 
foreign peacekeeping operations; this position clearly would have to be rectified if Germany was to 
become more involved in the Bosnian situation. 
  After article 87a was added to the Basic Law in the 1950s to accommodate German rearmament, 
the major political parties in Germany eventually accepted the position that article 87a permitted their 
country’s participation in NATO, but for different reasons.  These differences conflicted over the so-
called “out of area” problem: military intervention in non-NATO states.   The CDU/CSU felt NATO 
was a collective security body, and that German participation in military actions taken under UN, 
WEU, or NATO auspices - out of area or not - were not in conflict with the Basic Law.  Only a 
“supplemental clarification” of the Basic Law was necessary in their view to permit the Bundeswehr to 
participate in UN or EC military missions.  The SPD and FDP tended to oppose this idea, viewing 
NATO as a system of collective defense, thus favoring the strict view of article 87a.  This limited the 
Bundeswehr to the defense of NATO members as far as the FDP and SDP were concerned, unless a 
constitutional change took place.90  Stung by the criticism of Germany by its allies during the Gulf 
War, Kohl was determined to formulate, at a minimum, a legal interpretation, and at a maximum, a 
constitutional change, which would permit Germany to better meet its allied obligations where armed 
force was concerned. 
  The chancellor’s initial efforts towards these ends were thwarted in June 1991 when the SPD 
voted to prevent German forces from serving abroad, except as part of UN peacekeeping forces.  An 
overwhelming majority of Social Democrats said German forces could only be sent outside the NATO 
area to oversee a UN truce, as UN observers, or as part of peacekeeping operations with mixed civilian 
and military participation.  Volker Rühe, executive chancellor of the CDU and future defense minister, 
criticized the SPD for its position, saying that "under cover of their love for peace, the Social 
Democrats have irresponsibly isolated themselves not only in Europe, but in the entire world."  The 
decision was also condemned by the FDP, whose chairman said the SPD was incapable of bearing 
responsibility within Europe and NATO, and thus also "incapable of governing" Germany.91  At this 
point, then, when Germany’s specific obligations regarding a possible military mission in the Balkans 
were unclear, the FDP tended to side with Kohl on the issue despite its reservations. 
  Kohl's government continued its lobbying for a greater German military role after the 
Croatian/Slovenian/Bosnian recognition saga had been completed.  But here he had to overcome 
domestic opposition, divisions in his own coalition, and historical concerns.  The new German foreign 
minister, Klaus Kinkel (Genscher retired in May 1992 after 18 years in the position), announced at a 
meeting of the Western European Union (WEU) assembly in early June 1992 that the use of military 
means - by NATO or a new Franco-German "Eurocorps" under WEU auspices - to enforce the Balkan 
embargo must not be ruled out, but should only be a last recourse.  He then added that German 
participation in a possible military intervention should be avoided at all costs due to "historical 
reasons" (i.e., the Nazi occupation of Yugoslavia during World War II).92  During this same month, 
polls revealed that 42 percent of Germans thought their country could do without armed forces, while 
11 percent were undecided on the issue.  With a military force composed entirely of draftees, the 
option of alternative service - a guaranteed right under the German constitution - was growing more 
attractive to an increasing number of young Germans and inhibited Germany's efforts to construct a 
new military role for itself.93 
  Two weeks after the WEU assembly meeting, where all nine members of the organization agreed 
in principle to undertake military operations on behalf of the UN, Germany repeated that it could not 
take place in operations outside of NATO soil thanks to its 1949 constitution, although it hoped it 
would be able to amend it in the near future.94  Until then, Germany could participate only in the 
Standing Naval Force-Mediterranean under joint WEU/NATO command by sending one destroyer and 
three reconnaissance planes to help monitor the Balkan embargo.  Kinkel argued that this mission was 
compatible with Germany's constitution because its forces would remain inside NATO territory (in the 
Adriatic) and would not enter either the territorial waters or the air space of the former Yugoslav 
republic.  NATO reiterated that these forces could only monitor the embargo; they would not have 
authority to stop any vessels at this point.  Radio contacts, not physical encounters, would be used to 
determine cargo and destinations.95 
  Even with these limitations, however, the German deployment provoked serious criticisms by the 
SPD.  In the view of the opposition, the action was the most serious and questionable “test case” yet 
for determining a new German military role; they felt Germany was rapidly headed down a slippery slope to other foreign adventures since German participation in humanitarian operations was taking 
place in Cambodia and now being considered for Somalia and Bosnia.  SPD parlia-mentary leader 
Hans-Ulrich Klose said his party "will not permit a sneaking movement toward combat missions by the 
German military around the world."  Another SPD legislator argued that German troops could deliver 
aid to Sarajevo, but the Adriatic naval patrol "has nothing to do with humanitarian aid.  This naval 
action is not about the people (of Bosnia). . . but about the govern-ment using the Yugoslav crisis to try 
to broaden the (German military's) deployment area - in violation of the constitution."  German public 
opinion was also divided on the issue: a majority opposed participation in efforts to enforce a cease-
fire in Yugoslavia or in any military missions outside NATO territory, but the same number were 
willing to permit their country's participation in UN peacekeeping forces, particularly when the 
delivery of humanitarian aid was involved.96 
  To halt the German deployment, the SPD first forced a special emergency session of parliament to 
decide the issue on July 22.  SPD leader Klose again pushed his position that the German military is a 
"defensive army and not an intervention army."  But the German assembly clearly supported the 
deployment, leading the SPD, as in the debate over EMU and Maastricht, to issue a legal challenge to 
it before the German Constitutional Court.  Although the SPD was not against German participation in 
all peacekeeping missions, it believed that legal issues concerning these matters needed to be clarified 
to avoid violating Germany's fundamental law, a sentiment also felt by the head of the CDU 
parliamentary group, Wolfgang Schaube.97  These constitutional questions would not be resolved - 
and then only temporarily - for nearly a year. 
  After the embargo on Serbia and Montenegro was tightened into a combined NATO/ WEU naval 
blockade in November 1992, German defense minister Volker Rühe (who replaced Stoltenberg in 
March 1992) also stressed that his country's constitution did not prohibit parti-cipation since the 
limited German forces in the Adriatic were acting only in a support role and would not engage in 
hostilities.  Kinkel joined in him in arguing before the press that Germany would not take part in "stop 
and search" operations in order to stay within Germany's legal provisions.98  Since other WEU 
members did not take issue with Germany's participation in the operations, and later encouraged 
Germany to contribute, it is likely that their remarks were directed more toward their fellow Germans 
than to assuage Germany's allies. 
  Indeed, through the fall of 1992 government officials continued their domestic lobbying for 
greater German participation in peacekeeping operations.  A few breakthroughs were achieved as the 
violence escalated, reports of atrocities filtered out, and the besieged region set in for another bleak 
winter.  In mid-November the SPD finally agreed to help amend the constitutional ban on military 
involvement outside the NATO area, which in their view should be approved by the German 
parliament on a case-by-case basis.99 
  Later, in a break with his own party, the FDP, Kinkel in January 1993 stated that Germany should 
be able to contribute forces to such "blue helmet" operations and to combat missions, but only under 
specific UN auspices, with a decision of the UN Security Council.  If such a decision could not be 
reached, Kinkel said it would be incumbent upon other regional organizations - the CSCE or the WEU 
- to take the lead.  His position was on the matter was enhanced soon after when Kohl's ruling coalition 
agreed that Germany should be allowed to participate in such opera-tions provided that the parliament 
approved of the action.  Previously the FDP had argued the need for constitutional changes before 
Germany should join such missions.  After the CDU/CSU/ FDP coalition had reached a tentative 
agreement on this issue, the SPD again stressed the necessary support of the parliament before any 
military intervention could be permitted.  The SPD parliamentary defense policy spokesman, Walter 
Kolbow, said his party might even support a German role in combat missions provided they were 
approved by the UN Security Council, commanded directly by the UN, and approved by both houses 
of the German parliament in each case.  He conceded that "Reality will force this on us anyway."  Also 
during this period, Kohl, Kinkel, and Rühe began to consider lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia 
if peacekeeping did not work, but they still opposed any German participation in ground force 
operations.100 
  The most contentious “escalatory step” was taken after the U.S. began airdrops of humanitarian 
supplies to the Bosnians.  Germany considered lending air support to help with the delivery of aid and 
with the enforcement of the "no-fly zone" over Bosnia mandated by the UN in April.101  Kohl 
supported the participation of German airmen in Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) 
radar flights which would not engage other forces in hostilities.  But such participation would be the first time since 1945 that Germans had gone into a war zone, and the first NATO combat mission ever.  
These implications again heated up Germany's internal debate over the legality of military intervention 
and exposed serious rifts in Kohl's coalition. 
  In an unprecedented and highly unusual spectacle, Kohl arranged for his government to sue itself 
over the issue.  Desperate to meet his NATO obligations, the German chancellor announced his party's 
support for German participation, but Kinkel's FDP immediately broke ranks and sued the government 
in a pre-arranged compromise with Kohl's Christian Democrats to force the issue onto the national 
stage.  It was "The most embarrassing cabinet session of the year," as one German cabinet official put 
it; other German officials called the peculiar deal an "utter farce" and "pathological," while German 
newspapers across the political spectrum also denounced it as an "April Fool's joke" and an 
"embarrassment" to their country.  Kohl argued back on German television that if he had not tried to 
break the stalemate, "Germany's isolation in the world would have been catastrophic.  It is bad enough 
as it is.  The world does not understand what is being discussed here."  Both the SPD and the FDP 
again pressed for an injunction to stop the German deployment until constitutional questions could be 
resolved.  This forced foreign minister Kinkel and defense minister Rühe to argue against each other in 
court over the issue, while other cabinet members and military officials warned that Kohl's coalition 
could break up and Germany could become isolated in NATO if the deployment was prohibited.102 
  To help boost Kohl's position, NATO secretary general (and former German defense minister) 
Manfred Woerner testified to the court that German participation in the air missions was essential for 
the operation's success and for the reputation of NATO.  He also warned of "an ever-growing 
impatience in the alliance" with Germany's difficulties in participating in such missions.  This 
argument was also helped when NATO's supreme commander in Europe, General John Shalikashvili, 
stated that if German crews were withdrawn from NATO aircraft, which were under the command of a 
German general and largely manned by Germans, it would be "extremely difficult to handle."  Another 
NATO official had previously observed that "Should it get to enforcement, and the Germans were not 
participating, there would be a significant impact on the operational capability of the AWACS," an 
assessment echoed by German military chief of staff General Klaus Naumann.  Thus Germany not 
only found itself in a difficult position during this incident, which caused its allies to question the 
Germans' reliability, but Germany's domestic difficulties may have in part caused a delay in NATO's 
mission (of course, French concerns about maintaining close coordination with the UN to protect 
forces on the ground also played a role).  Kohl won the ruling by a vote of five to three and the mission 
began a few days later.  The decision was televised live throughout the nation, and the court seemed 
more impressed with arguments stressing the political damage that might have occurred if the Germans 
had refused to join the NATO mission since it held off on judging the legality of the issue for several 
months.103 
  This historic decision soon enabled Germany to participate in the aid mission to Somalia as well, 
and a senior adviser to Kohl defended this piecemeal approach with the statement that "We will have 
to continue making these decisions on a case-by-case basis until we can reach both a public and 
political consensus.  We are not a big Switzerland and cannot be one.  But there remains a strong 
pacifist stream both in the Social Democratic Party and in German society."   Although Kohl won this 
round temporarily, he suffered a snub in late May when the Washington conference on Bosnia 
excluded the Germans.  Britain, France, Russia, Spain, and the U.S. used this forum to discuss the 
possibility of creating "security zones" in Bosnia while Germany was left fuming on the sidelines.  
Kohl and Kinkel initially criticized this ultimately failed agreement as they felt it might have 
legitimized Serb military gains, but they agreed to it a week later in a meeting with France.104  
However, Kohl again broke with his European partners at the end of June when he joined with 
President Clinton in trying to persuade the EC to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia after the Vance-
Owen plan finally was pronounced dead by Lord Owen himself.  Kohl argued forcefully toward this 
end at the European Council on June 21, but Britain and France expressed concern for their troops on 
the ground and rejected Kohl's overtures.105 
  The German chancellor did make progress on the domestic front during late 1993 when all the 
major German parties put Bosnia at the top of their agendas at their individual foreign policy 
conferences.  Kohl admonished his political rivals to address the question of Germany's future role in 
the world before the country became preoccupied with domestic issues during the wave of 19 German 
elections in 1994.  He also was anxious to land his country a permanent seat on the UN Security 
Council.  As Kinkel argued during a parliamentary debate, "You know perfectly well that we will only achieve a seat on the Security Council once we have taken care of this urgently needed constitutional 
amendment."  Kohl's ruling coalition complied, and the SPD's new leader, Rudolph Scharping, 
attempted to move his party more in line with Kohl's vision on German participation in peacekeeping.  
But the SPD’s rank and file in parliament sharply rejected Scharping's proposal and maintained its 
general opposition to the use of German forces abroad.  Although the Social Democrats favored the 
Security Council seat, their party whip Guenter Verheugen said that "it's not a priority" for his party 
and acted accordingly.  As an aside, the Greens also opposed intervention at first, as they had during 
the Gulf War, but leading elements of the party (mainly feminists incensed at the raping of women in 
Bosnia) eventually became the most vocal supporters of the use of force.  The party’s Regional 
Council voted to approve German participation in UN military operations to halt outright aggression 
and genocide, in Bosnia or elsewhere.  This decision was struck down, however, by the Green Federal 
Board.  Finally, the Party for Democratic Socialism, successor to the former ruling party in 
the  GDR,  unequivocally opposed any expansion of the Bundeswehr’s role.  It was the only major 
party not to split at some point over the most contentious issue since Brandt’s inauguration of 
Ostpolitik.106 
  Thus, as in the case of the EMS crisis, we see that Germany's most recent efforts to secure a new 
political role for itself have been nearly overwhelmed by domestic attitudes conditioned by decades of 
cautious involvement in collective action.  More importantly, these attitudes were legitimized in the 
government since the German system permitted the SPD to bring the issue before the constitutional 
court.  Also, the FDP’s key role as a junior coalition partner in most post-war governments, and as 
holder of the foreign ministry portfolio, provided it with the power to make Kohl’s government think 
cautiously about foreign involvement and search for compromise before recklessly committing 
German forces abroad.  These domestic traditions concerning consensual government and the role of 
force in German foreign policy, with the FDP playing a key mediating role between the two major 
parties, acted as checks on Germany’s ability to play a greater role in helping to resolve the situation in 
the Balkans. 
  Besides these domestic legal and historical dilemmas with which Kohl was forced to contend, 
however, Germany and its EU partners were also severely constrained by the weak provisions 
concerning political cooperation among the Twelve.  While EMS rules at least provide some 
guidelines on how cooperation is supposed to take place in monetary affairs (i.e., in defending 
currencies or instituting a realignment), EC provisions on European Political Cooperation (EPC) do not 
include explicit criteria for imposing sanctions or for undertaking military interventions (or for much 
else).  Decisionmaking rules and procedures for EPC are explicitly designed to prevent the usurpation 
of power over European foreign policy by any one EC member. 
  In the first place, EPC outcomes are largely ad hoc, intergovernmental negotiations between the 
foreign ministers of the Twelve; major decisions must be approved by consensus, and there are no 
legal mechanisms to enforce them.  In addition, even when agreement is reached on the desirability of 
a European response, individual states have much leeway in their contributions to a cooperative effort.  
During the Gulf War, for example, only Spain and Portugal participated in identical ways, although all 
except Ireland "cooperated" in the effort to expel Iraq from Kuwait.107  Hence the costs of a common 
foreign and security policy, like some other policy areas, are borne disproportionately among EC 
members.  Finally, the two chief instruments for exerting EC pressure on non-members, foreign aid 
and economic sanctions, proved highly inadequate after the war escalated and the stakes in the conflict 
became greater for all parties.  In sum, the case of the wreckage of Yugoslavia shows how a mounting 
crisis clearly and rapidly outpaced any efforts on the part of the Europeans to formulate a cooperative 
response to the violence using institutional mechanisms at the EC level. 
  The Twelve had first attempted to invoke EPC even during the recognition phase by offering a 
European Monitoring Mission in case a stable cease-fire could be negotiated.  This effort failed thanks 
to the rapidity with which the warring factions broke the agreements.  In the absence of any agreement 
which could be brokered by the EC, the Twelve were forced to consider actions such as sanctions-
monitoring, peacemaking, and the delivery of aid, most of which required a military component in this 
situation, a policy area decidedly underdeveloped in the European Union.  At the same time, the EC, 
led by the Council of Ministers, kept trying to arrange cease-fire agreements and may have helped to 
keep the conflict in Croatia limited, but these efforts were repeatedly unsuccessful in Bosnia.  For the 
most part, then, the EPC mechanism only served its typical, limited, declaratory purpose during the 
crisis: as a forum for announcing watered-down, "lowest-common- denominator" condemnations of the conflict in Bosnia.  In a situation where military action seemed appropriate only to some member 
states, institutional rules to achieve this at the EC level proved a serious constraint on leadership by 
any individual member state on the issue.108 
  After months of feeble EPC declarations, broken cease-fires, and mounting violence, both 
Germany and France attempted to take the lead on Bosnia.  By late 1993 Germany had temporarily 
resolved its constitutional issues and the EU's  common  foreign and security policy, supposedly more 
substantial than EPC, was inaugurated in November, along with the rest of the Maastricht treaty.  
France and Germany called for more strenuous efforts on the part of the EU to resolve the Bosnian 
situation, and for regular meetings of European affairs ministers to help foster foreign policy 
cooperation, but the two received a cool response from the others.  The smaller states in particular 
were highly sensitive to the idea of a common foreign policy being dictated by Paris and Bonn.  Also, 
the European Commission opposed any more appropriation by individual states of its role, limited but 
formalized by Maastricht, in foreign affairs.109  The  Franco-German- Belgian  Eurocorps was 
established at this time also, but it too lacked any formal mechanism enabling it to play a major role in 
Bosnia. 
  Although it is still too early to make a definitive judgement on the role of Germany in facilitating 
European cooperation to stop the carnage in Bosnia, events in 1994 essentially followed previous 
patterns.  The year began with divisions in the EU over how to end the siege of Sarajevo.  Germany, 
with some support from Belgium and Italy, called for a stronger military response (NATO airstrikes) 
against the Serbs after 68 were killed in a mortar attack on the distressed city, but Britain, France, and 
Spain in particular expressed reservations.  The official EU mediator in the Balkans also urged against 
the stronger use of military force in the area.110  In addition to the EPC shortcomings, the EU in 
general was bogged down over several other serious matters.  Greece, which held the EU presidency, 
made an issue over the EU’s pending recognition of Macedonia.  Spain and Britain had reservations 
about changes concerning representation in the European Parliament and voting in the Council of 
Ministers to accommodate German unification and the next enlargement.  Finally, the EU was divided 
over whom to select as a  replacement for Delors (among other disputes). 
  France and Germany did reach agreement to cooperate in regards to the situation in Bosnia, and to 
coordinate their successive EU presidencies from July 1994 to June 1995 (Spain later joined them on 
this initiative).111  But once again Germany became occupied with domestic concerns, namely the 
wave of elections taking place in 1994 at all levels of government.  German public opinion was still at 
low levels concerning German participation in European integration, and the SPD gave the CDU its 
worst defeat since 1959 in the first local elections in March, in Germany's third-largest state of Lower 
Saxony.112  Soon after this event politicians from the right and left stepped up their calls for cuts in 
Germany's contribution to the EU budget; they were joined by the Bundesbank and finance minister 
Waigel.  These concerns soon prompted the government to press for a reconsideration of Germany's 
contributions to the EU, and possibly a rebate along the lines of what Britain had received.  Bonn said 
it would pursue such aims during Germany's European Council presidency.113 
  Germany's European Union ambassador Dietrich von Kyaw said also that the elections would 
constrain Germany's ability to lead on the Balkans or other matters during its presidency.  He warned 
against expecting any miracle solutions from Germany on the former Yugoslavia, whose problems he 
said were "stronger than us."  At best "some progress" could be made by the end of the presidency on 
this issue as "the process of ripening (the peace process) has to continue."  Similarly, Kinkel told the 
eastern Europeans not to have inflated expectations of what Germany's presidency could do for them in 
regards to joining the EU, although he later announced that elections in his country and in France 
would have no effect on Germany's assumption of its six-month EU presidency in the second half of 
the year.  As he put it, "We will not let ourselves be hampered in any way (by elections).  Elections 
must not play a role, because we are acting for 12 and soon 16 (after the anticipated accession of 
Sweden, Finland, Austria, and Norway) European countries and not just for ourselves."  However, a 
foreign policy official for the CDU argued instead that "Until May 1995, we are all lame ducks," 
suggesting that Franco-German leadership would be in short supply given domestic electoral 
concerns.114 
  These predictions were for the most part confirmed during Germany's EU presidency in the 
second half of 1994.  Following EU custom, Bonn announced an ambitious set of goals it intended to 
pursue during its six months in the driver’s seat.  These included improving the operation of EU 
institutions, implementing the White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment, administrative deregulation, enlargement, and of course, Bosnia.  Like its predecessors in the position, 
Germany hoped to make progress in achieving a negotiated end to the war and to strengthening the 
WEU as a defense arm for the EU's still-evolving common foreign and security policy.115 
  The Germans had a good start with a major constitutional court victory in mid-July finally 
allowing military operations abroad (provided the German parliament approved).  Kohl was 
understandably pleased with the hard-won decision, but to lessen fears at home and abroad of German 
militarism he also stressed that "When and where Germany gets involved will be decided in Germany.  
What this leads to will have to be decided on a case-by-case basis."  German news-papers noted Kohl's 
caution as well at appearances with President Clinton during his Berlin visit, which coincided with the 
court's ruling.  As one put it, "On the first day of the American's visit, the chancellor never tired of 
saying the word 'Europe' and of praising the advantages of the European Union in well-apportioned 
doses, as if the American president's calls for more leader-ship did not reach him."  Another suggested 
that Clinton was putting more responsibility on Germany than officials in Bonn really wanted, since he 
named Germany as the main U.S. ally in Europe and repeated his call for German participation in UN 
operations abroad.  Again, Kohl was careful to play down this radical change in Germany's position 
and kept the issue quiet during his campaign.  As his strategists remarked, “there were few votes to be 
won in telling Germans their sons might have to die abroad again.”116 
  Most recently, Germany and its allies have had to consider whether and how to extract UN 
peacekeeping forces since efforts towards mediation have proved such a dismal failure.  Divided over 
how to become involved, the allies are now divided over how to get out.  Although Germany's EU 
presidency was not directed toward this new problem, Kohl's reelection in October gave him enough 
political capital to be able to offer six to eight German Tornado jet fighters to NATO in the event of a 
hasty UN retreat from Bosnia.  This would mark the  Luftwaffe 's first foreign combat mission since 
World War II and may take the Germans one small step closer to fulfilling their new military 
obligations.  Two months after this decision, the Germans said they would be willing to include 2,000 
troops to help with the UN retreat if this becomes necessary. 117  
  In sum, these events concerning the break-up of Yugoslavia demonstrate, like the EMU/EMS case, 
that Germany is still operating under some very real constraints as it tries to bring its political clout up 
to a level equal to that of its economic power.  Led by Genscher and Kohl, German diplomacy was 
successful in recognition, but their country has since endured nearly three years of internal discord 
over how to measure up in international peacekeeping and military intervention.  With legal and 
historical constraints regarding German participation still in operation for many months during the 
crisis, the country instead took pains to concentrate its efforts in other areas: humanitarian aid, 
accepting refugees, and reforming EU asylum policy in general.118  At the same time, the Germans 
worked to overcome their country’s formal and informal institutional prohibitions which protected 
against German self-aggrandizement.  This was necessary if Germany was to have any hopes of living 
up to its obligations to NATO and the EU’s still-evolving common foreign and security policy. 
  Much as the Bundesbank represents a possibly excessive German vigilance against inflation, the 
formerly strict interpretation of articles 26 and 87a guarded the Germans against risky military 
adventures.  The SPD and FDP were able to articulate this view in Bonn during Germany’s debate over 
this issue.  It must be said that Kohl was remarkably successful in changing the official view of the 
German constitution.  However, it took a long time and, like during the domestic ratification debate 
over Maastricht, the electoral contests of 1994 and fickle German opinion assured that he had to move 
very cautiously.  In addition, the weak provisions existing at the EU level to deal with a situation like 
Bosnia prevented any one EU member from pushing its preferred solution.  Of course, this is not to say 
that Germany would have been able to "solve" the problems of Bosnia had it not been shackled by 
domestic and international constraints.  Certainly the problems caused by such ethnic turmoil are 
beyond the efforts of any one country.  But the unanimity requirement on matters of foreign policy and 
more importantly, the lack of a more effective EU peacekeeping/defense component and command 
structure, prevented those who favored stronger military action against the Serbs (such as Germany) 
from exercising their preferences in a cooperative European setting. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
   The two cases discussed in this essay reveal considerable constraints, institutional and otherwise, 
at both the domestic and the EU levels which can hinder cooperative  policymaking  in Europe, even 
when a country as powerful as Germany is involved.  German interests changed as different German 
actors became involved in EU policy in different settings, depending on decisionmaking procedures in 
the domestic and EU arenas.  From the negotiations over EMU and the recognition of Croatia and 
Slovenia, to the EMS crisis and the Balkan wars, German leadership of European foreign and 
monetary policy ranged from the influential to the ineffectual depending on the task at hand and on 
who was acting on the part of Germany. 
  In the case of EMU negotiations, Kohl's effective articulation of long-term German monetary 
goals before and during the Maastricht negotiations proved a vital source of leadership in the early 
drive toward EMU.  This influence was undermined when the Bundesbank resumed short-term 
maintenance of German monetary policy after December 1991 and Kohl was forced to contend with a 
difficult ratification battle at home during the EMS crisis.  In the case of the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia, Germany again clearly took the lead in engineering the EC's recognition of the former 
republics, an effort largely conducted by foreign minister Genscher.  However, once the stakes in the 
conflict were raised, placing new demands on Germany and involving new actors, Kohl found it 
difficult even to participate, let alone lead, since he had to take considerable pains to restructure his 
country's internal legal provisions and attitudes concerning the use of German force abroad. 
  These differences in German influence significantly depend on political processes, policy stages, 
and issue areas at both the EU and the domestic levels.  Germany's authority before and during the 
crises was a result of which domestic actors or institutions were empowered and the extent to which 
EU institutions permitted leadership by individual states.  These factors in turn depend on the issue 
area at hand and the type of decision being made.  Treaty-making and diplomatic recognition empower 
national executives.  But once ratification, day-to-day policy-making, or (in the case of Germany) the 
restructuring of domestic political traditions become a greater priority, leadership becomes constrained.  
Domestic institutions can constrain national governments as they try to maneuver in the EU arena, 
preventing some policy options and making possible others.  Thus any EU member lacking a strong 
and effective domestic mandate in the issue area under consideration will likely find it difficult to exert 
influence on its partners once authority moves from intergovernmental decisions to other areas 
of  policymaking.   These domestic institutional capacities and constraints are further conditioned by 
rules and procedures at the EU level, which may foster or inhibit the conversion of member state 
power into leadership ability. 
  These crises raise the important question of how domestic political institutions and traditions may 
have difficulties supporting both the goals of the state and the broader goals of European integration.  
Domestic institutions are often created to fulfill the most highly valued and broadly-based societal 
goals, yet their legislative mandates and structures may or may not foster the achievement of EU goals 
set by heads of state.  As European integration proceeds, the likely result is an increasing amount of 
domestic institutional restructuring, and possibly convergence, according to shared European norms in 
order to bring about the vision of a united Europe.  France, Belgium, and other EU members displayed 
their realization of this insight when they made major efforts to bring about the independence of their 
central banks during the crisis to match the strengths of the Bundesbank.  Similarly, Germany's 
political and legal decisions concerning the use of force abroad helped to bring its effectiveness in this 
area closer to that of its allies.  The formerly-neutral new member states, Austria, Finland, and Sweden, 
also endured domestic reforms of their defense policies in anticipation of joining the EU and the 
common foreign and security policy.  As others have observed in the case of France, these processes 
may be viewed as a broader move toward the “Europeanization” of domestic politics among member 
states to harmonize them with common EU norms and goals. 119  
  Both the EMS and Yugoslavian crises demonstrate the importance of legal foundations, public 
support, and immunity from influence when member states are charged with implementing policies 
designed to further integrate Europe.  This may be especially true in policy areas which are relatively 
underdeveloped at the EU level, such as the EMS and EPC, due to lingering concerns over national 
sovereignty and autonomy in these sensitive areas.  At this level as well institutional arrangements can 
enable or inhibit the capacity of individual member states to initiate effective leadership in Europe.  
Without explicit mechanisms to bring about a badly-needed preventative realignment of the EMS or to 
engineer a more effective peacekeeping force in Bosnia, and because of the unanimity requirement in both areas of  policymaking,  Germany (or any other EU member) found it very difficult to exert more 
influence than it did. 
  These two crises reflect serious inadequacies in the institutional design for monetary and foreign 
policy cooperation, and suggest that it may be useful to organize assessment of leadership within the 
EU along functional lines by policy area, then by institutional mechanisms first at the EU level and 
then at the domestic level during ratification debates and day-to-day  policymaking.   When 
domestic  policymaking is dominated by an insulated agency (such as a central bank) with clear 
programmatic goals in harmony with EU aspirations, integration might develop more smoothly.  When 
domestic structures and traditions call for the involvement of courts, opposition parties, and public 
opinion to implement policies decided at the EU level, it might become more difficult for the goals of 
integration to be reached.  The challenge, of course, is to maintain some semblance of democratic 
accountability at both levels without derailing the entire integration project.120  Despite declarations to 
the contrary, EU members are still loath to surrender their national authority over monetary and foreign 
policy to the EU.  Thus, until member states’ monetary discipline imitates the Bundesbank model, 
whose structure serves as a blueprint for EMU, and until their foreign policymaking mechanisms more 
readily permit involvement in EU defense policy, EMU and the common foreign and 
security  policy  may  develop only  haphazardly in  fits and starts, in a multiple-speed Europe, if they 
develop at all. 
 